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Impeded Industrial Restructuring: 
The Growth Penalty
David B. Audretsch, Martin A. Carree, 
Adriaan J. van Stel and A. Roy Thurik*
I. INTRODUCTION
Explanations for economic growth have generally been restricted to the realm
of macroeconomics (Romer 1990, Krugman 1991). However, a different schol-
arly tradition linking growth to industrial organization dates back at least to
Schumpeter (1934). According to this tradition, performance, measured in
terms of economic growth, is shaped by the degree to which the industry struc-
ture most efﬁciently utilizes scarce resources. But what determines this optimal
structure? There is a long-standing tradition in the ﬁeld of industrial organiza-
tion devoted towards identifying the determinants of industry structure. As
early as 1948, Blair stated that technology is the most important determinant of
industry structure1. Scherer and Ross (1990) and Chandler (1990) expand the
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1. See Blair (1948, p.121): ‘The whole subject of the comparative efﬁciency of different sizes of
business has long raised one of the most perplexing dilemmas in the entire body of economic
theory.... But a beginning must be made sometime in tackling this whole size-efﬁciency prob-
lem on an empirical basis. The ﬁrst step in any such undertaking would logically be that of stud-
ying the underlying technological forces of the economy, since it is technology which largely
determines the relationship between the size of plant and efﬁciency’.D. B. AUDRETSCH, M. A. CARREE, A. J. VAN STEL AND A. R. THURIK
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determinants of optimal industry structure to include other factors as well as
the underlying technology. Dosi (1988, p.1157), in his systematic review of the
literature in the Journal of Economic Literature, concludes that
‘Each production activity is characterized by a particular distribution of ﬁrms’.
When the determinants of the underlying industrial structure are stable, the in-
dustry structure itself would not be expected to change. However, a change in
the underlying determinants would be expected to result in a change in the op-
timal industry structure. Certainly, Chandler (1990) and Scherer and Ross
(1990) identiﬁed a shift in optimal industry structure towards increased central-
ization and concentration throughout the ﬁrst two-thirds of the previous century
as a result of changes in the underlying technology along with other factors.
More recently, a series of studies has identiﬁed a change in the determinants
underlying the industry structure that has reversed this trend. The most salient
point of this change is that technology, globalization, deregulation, labor sup-
ply, variety in demand, and the resulting higher levels of uncertainty have ren-
dered a shift in the industry structure away from greater concentration and cen-
tralization towards less concentration and decentralization. So, the industry
structure is generally shifting towards an increased role for small enterprises.
However, the extent and timing of this shift is anything but identical across
countries. Rather, the shift in industry structures has been heterogeneous and
apparently shaped by country-speciﬁc factors (Carree et al. 2002, Thurik
1996). Apparently, institutions and policies in certain countries have facilitated
a greater and more rapid response to globalization and technological change,
along with the other underlying factors, by shifting to a less centralized indus-
try structure than has been the case in other countries. An implication of this
high variance in industry restructuring is that some countries are likely to have
industry structures that are different from ‘optimal’.
While the evidence suggests that the restructuring paths of industry vary
considerably across countries, virtually nothing is known about the conse-
quences of lagging behind in this process. Do countries with an industry struc-
ture that deviates considerably from the optimal industry structure forfeit
growth more than countries deviating less from the optimal industry structure?
This question is crucial to policy makers, because if the opportunity cost, meas-
ured in terms of forgone growth, of a slow adjustment towards the optimal in-
dustry structure is low, the consequences of not engaging in a rapid adjustment
process are relatively trivial. However, if the opportunity cost is high the con-
sequences are more alarming. The purpose of this paper is to identify the im-
pact of deviations in the actual industry structure from the optimal industry
structure on growth.IMPEDED INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING
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In the second Section of this paper, the shift in industry structure away from
more to less concentrated production is documented and underlying explana-
tions provided. In the third Section, we use a data base linking industry struc-
ture to growth rates for a panel of 18 European countries spanning ﬁve years to
test the hypothesis that deviations from the optimal industry structure result in
reduced growth rates. Finally, in the last Section conclusions are provided. In
particular, we ﬁnd that deviations from the optimal industry structure, meas-
ured in terms of the relative importance of small ﬁrms, have had an adverse ef-
fect on economic growth rates.
II. THE SHIFT IN INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
A wide range of studies identiﬁed systematic evidence documenting two im-
posing characteristics of industry structure over the ﬁrst two-thirds of the pre-
vious century (Scherer and Ross 1990, Chandler 1990). The ﬁrst is that the de-
gree of centralization of production was steadily increasing over time. The
second is that production was at its highest point of centralization and concen-
tration in the 1970s. This reﬂected underlying technological and demand char-
acteristics rendering large-scale production and organization more efﬁcient.
1. Until 1970s: Large Businesses as 
the Engine of Growth
Giant corporations were seen as the sole and most powerful engine of economic
and technological progress in the early post war period. Schumpeter (1950)
provided an image of large corporations gaining the competitive advantage
over small and new ones and of giant corporations ultimately dominating the
entire economic landscape. This advantage would be due to scale economies in
the production of new economic and technological knowledge. These scale
economies would result from the organization of teams of highly trained spe-
cialists working on technological progress in a routinized fashion. The large
corporation was thought to have both superior production efﬁciency and supe-
rior innovative efﬁcacy. Galbraith (1956) pointed out that in his world of coun-
tervailing power large corporations are superior to small ones in nearly every
aspect of economic behavior like productivity, technological advance, compen-
sation and job security. In his world all major societal institutions contributed
to the maintenance of the stability and predictability needed for mass produc-
tion. In these worlds of Schumpeter and Galbraith there is little room for smallD. B. AUDRETSCH, M. A. CARREE, A. J. VAN STEL AND A. R. THURIK
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scale, experimenting ﬁrms thriving on the uncertainty of technological ad-
vance, whimsical markets and the individual energy of an obstinate entrepre-
neur. Only large industrial units were thought to be able to compete on global
markets producing global products.
The exploitation of economies of scale and scope was thought to be at the
heart of dictating an industry structure characterized by concentration and cen-
tralization (Teece 1993). Chandler (1990) stresses the importance of invest-
ment in production, distribution, and management needed to exploit economies
of scale and scope. Audretsch (1995) stresses the inﬂuence the image of the
East-European economies and the perceived Soviet threat had on Western pol-
icy makers. An important concern in the late 1950s and early 1960s was the as-
sumed strong technological progress emerging from huge and concentrated re-
search and development programs being assembled in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. It was a period of relatively well-deﬁned technological trajec-
tories, of a stable demand and of seemingly clear advantages of diversiﬁcation.
Audretsch and Thurik (2001) characterize this period as one where stability,
continuity and homogeneity were the cornerstones and label it the managed
economy. Small businesses were considered to be a vanishing breed.
2. From 1970s on: Shift in Economic Activity 
Toward Small Firms
Perhaps it was the demise of the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union that made it clear that concentration and centralization
were no longer the cornerstones of the most efﬁcient industry structure. At the
same time, more and more evidence became available that economic activity
moved away from large ﬁrms to small, predominantly young ﬁrms. Brock and
Evans (1989) provided an extensive documentation of the changing role of
small business in the U.S. economy. They were the ﬁrst to understand these new
developments ﬁlling the void of economic research concerning formation, dis-
solution and growth of businesses and concerning the differential impact of
regulations across business size classes. The new role of small ﬁrms and their
new interaction with large ones is described in Nooteboom (1994). Various au-
thors have provided empirical evidence for this new role. Blau (1987) showed
that the proportion of self-employed in the U.S. labor force began to rise in the
late 1970s. Acs and Audretsch (1993) and Carlsson (1992) provided a survey
of evidence concerning manufacturing industries in countries in varying stages
of economic development. Acs (1996) shows that the self-employment rate in
OECD countries declined until 1977 and increased between then and 1987.IMPEDED INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING
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Carree et al. (2002) show that for a sample of 23 OECD countries the average
business ownership rate increased from 9.6% in 1976 to 11% in 19962.
There has been considerable documentation of the shift in the structure of
American industry. Carlsson (1989) showed that the share of the Fortune 500
in total manufacturing employment dropped from 79% in 1975 to 73% in 1985.
In the same period the share of these ﬁrms in total manufacturing shipments
dropped from 83% to 78%. More recently, he shows that the employment share
of the Fortune 500 dropped to 58% in 1996 and the latter to 75% (Carlsson
1999). Unfortunately, similar documentation for Europe has not been possible
due to the absence of systematic data that is comparable across countries. How-
ever, Eurostat has begun to publish yearly summaries of the ﬁrm size distribu-
tion of EU-members at the two-digit industry level for the entire private sector,
see Eurostat (1994 and 1996). The efforts of Eurostat are currently being sup-
plemented by the European Network of SME Research (ENSR), a co-operation
of 18 European institutes. This organization publishes a yearly report of the
structure and the developments of the enterprise and establishment populations
in the countries of the European Union3.
3. Explaining the Shift in Industry Structure
Carlsson (1992) offers two explanations for the shift in the industry structure
away from large corporations and towards small enterprises. The ﬁrst deals
with fundamental changes occurring in the world economy from the 1970s on-
wards. These changes relate to the intensiﬁcation of global competition, the in-
crease in the degree of uncertainty and the growth in market fragmentation. The
second deals with changes in the character of technological progress. He shows
that ﬂexible automation has had various effects resulting in a shift from large
to smaller ﬁrms. The shift in the nature of technological progress particularly
involving ﬂexible automation facilitated product differentiation and led to a
new division of labor involving more cooperation and less competition between
large and small ﬁrms. Piore and Sabel (1984) argue that in the 1970s ﬁrms and
policy makers were unable to maintain the conditions necessary to preserve
mass production. Mass production was based upon the input of special-purpose
machines and of semi-skilled workers and the output of standardized products.
2. In this study, the business ownership rate is deﬁned as the number of business owners or self-
employed outside the agricultural sector (including owner-managers of incorporated businesses
and excluding unpaid family workers), as a fraction of the total labour force.
3. See the various editions of European Observatory which provide an account of the state of small
business in Europe like, for instance, EIM/ENSR (1997).D. B. AUDRETSCH, M. A. CARREE, A. J. VAN STEL AND A. R. THURIK
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A fundamental change in the path of technological development led to the oc-
currence of vast diseconomies of scale. This market instability resulted in the
demise of mass production and promoted ﬂexible specialization. Piore and
Sabel use the term Industrial Divide for the ‘reversal of the trend’ from that to-
ward more large ﬁrms to that toward more small ones. Jensen (1993) refers to
the Third Industrial Revolution when describing the same phenomenon. Me-
redith (1987) discusses the advantages of a range of recently developed ﬂexible
production techniques for small-scaled enterprises. Audretsch and Thurik
(2000) point at the role knowledge plays when explaining the shift from the
managed economy to the entrepreneurial economy.
This shift away from large ﬁrms is not conﬁned to manufacturing industries.
Brock and Evans (1989) show that this trend has been economy-wide, at least
for the United States. They offer four additional reasons as to why this shift has
occurred: (1) the increase of labor supply; (2) changes in consumer tastes; (3)
relaxation of (entry) regulations and (4) the fact that we are in a period of cre-
ative destruction. Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) stress the inﬂuence of
two other trends of industrial restructuring: decentralization and vertical disin-
tegration of large companies and the formation of new business communities.
Furthermore, they emphasize the role of private and public policies promoting
the small business sector4.
4. The Effect of the Shift
The extent to which this shift in industry structure has inﬂuenced economic
performance has received limited attention. This has to do with a persistent lack
in knowledge of market structure dynamics (Audretsch 1995). In other words,
there is a lack in knowledge concerning questions like who enters and exits,
what determines this mobility and what are its effects, in particular on eco-
nomic performance. Here we are concerned with a key question in economics:
why do industries or economies grow? As discussed earlier, traditionally, the
prevalent assumption was that large enterprises are at the heart of the process
of innovation and creation of welfare. This assumption is generally referred to
as the Schumpeterian Hypothesis. Recently, the focus of attention has shifted
4. See also Carree et al. (2002) for a survey of the determinants of the shift away from a managed
and toward an entrepreneurial economy. An important consequence of the shift in consumer
tastes and the decentralization and vertical disintegration of large companies has been the in-
creased share of the service sector. Because enterprises in the service sector are, on average,
much smaller than in the manufacturing industry, this implies an increased share of small ﬁrms
at the economy-wide level.IMPEDED INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING
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towards whether the process of decentralization and deconcentration, which
virtually every industrialized country has experienced in the last two decades,
has had positive welfare implications. Audretsch (1995) calls this shift in ori-
entation of our social-economic thinking ‘the new learning’.
The link between the shift in the industry structure and subsequent growth can
be investigated in two distinct ways. First, by investigating the range of conse-
quences of the shift in the locus of economic activity. For instance, one may study
whether this shift has been favorable to the rejuvenation of industries and the pro-
cess of (radical) innovation5. Alternatively, one may focus on the importance of
the role of small ﬁrms in enhancing competition6. A yet different perspective on
the link between the shifting industry structure and performance has been to ex-
amine the relationship between small ﬁrms and job creation7. Lastly, the role of
small ﬁrms as a vehicle for entrepreneurship has been the focal point for a series
of studies. For example, Baumol (1990) provides an extensive account of the role
that entrepreneurial activities and their consequences for prosperity play
throughout history. Acs (1992) brings it all together in a short descriptive manner
in a survey of some consequences of the shift of economic activity from large to
smaller businesses. He claims that small ﬁrms play an important role in the econ-
omy as they are agents of change by their entrepreneurial activity, as they are a
source of considerable innovative activity, as they stimulate industry evolution
and as they create an important share of the newly generated jobs.
A second way to answer the question of how changes in the industry struc-
ture impact performance is to circumvent the intermediary variables of techno-
logical change, entrepreneurship, competitiveness and job generation to inves-
tigate a direct link between the shift and performance measures at the industry
or economy-wide level. Some preliminary empirical results of the relation be-
tween changes in the ﬁrm size distribution and economic growth are presented
in Thurik (1996). His analysis lacks a theoretical component but provides some
indication of an increase in the economy-wide share of small ﬁrms positively
affecting subsequent growth. Schmitz (1989) presents an endogenous growth
model relating entrepreneurial activity and economic growth. An important im-
plication of his model is that the equilibrium fraction of entrepreneurs is lower
than the social optimal level, providing a rationale for policies stimulating en-
5. See Acs and Audretsch (1990), Audretsch (1995) and Cohen and Klepper (1992, 1996).
6. See Audretsch (1995), Oughton and Whittam (1997) and You (1995). Nickell (1996), Nickell et
al. (1997) and Lever and Nieuwenhuijsen (1999) present evidence that competition, as measured
by an increased number of competitors, has a positive effect on the rate of total factor produc-
tivity growth.
7. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) and Carree and Klomp (1996) provide some insights in
the relationship between small ﬁrms and job creation.D. B. AUDRETSCH, M. A. CARREE, A. J. VAN STEL AND A. R. THURIK
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trepreneurial activity. Some evidence of a well-established historical (long-
term) relationship between ﬂuctuations in entrepreneurship and the rise and fall
of nations is assembled by Wennekers and Thurik (1999). In this respect we
also mention the work of Eliasson (1995) on economic growth through com-
petitive selection. He demonstrates that such a relation may be characterized by
signiﬁcant time lags up to a couple of decades.
The evaluation of the various consequences of the shift in the locus of eco-
nomic activity is necessary to establish whether it is desirable and whether it
should be promoted by economic policy. However, this evaluation is compli-
cated because none of these consequences is, in fact, independent of the other
three and because the evaluation offers something of a series of trade-offs.
Audretsch and Thurik (2001) contrast the most fundamental elements of the
newly emerging entrepreneurial economy with those of the managed economy
by identifying ﬁfteen trade-offs that are essential for these two polar worlds.
For instance, while total employment may rise due to new start-ups and declin-
ing average ﬁrm sizes, the lower average wages that small ﬁrms pay, may at
least partly offset the welfare effect induced by the employment growth. By fol-
lowing the second way we are able to investigate whether there has been an
overall growth-enhancing effect of the shift in the locus of economic activity
from ‘large’ to ‘small’. This is the subject of Section III.
III. ESTIMATING THE GROWTH PENALTY
In this Section we test the hypothesis that the extent of the gap between the ac-
tual industry structure and the optimal industry structure inﬂuences subsequent
growth. We start with the assumption that a country’s growth can be decom-
posed into two components: (i) growth that would have occurred with an opti-
mal industry structure, and (ii) the impact on growth occurring from any actual
deviations from that optimal industry structure. This can be represented by
∆ GNPcp = ∆ GNP*
cp – γ |SFPcp–1 – SFP*
c| (1)
where the dependent variable is the actual rate of economic growth. ∆ GNP*
cp is
the rate of economic growth in country c in the case where the actual industry
structure, summarized by small ﬁrm presence (SFP cp), is at the optimal level at
the start of the period p. For ease of exposition we assume that the optimal in-
dustry structure in a country remains constant for the total period under inves-
tigation. This is not vital to our analysis. Since we are considering only short-
term periods (maximum ﬁve years) this may be a reasonable assumption.IMPEDED INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING
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Industry structure is multidimensional and spans a broad array of character-
istics that defy measurement by a single statistic. However, as explained else-
where (Audretsch and Thurik 2000, 2001), the most salient characteristic driv-
ing the shift in industry structure from the managed to the entrepreneurial
economy is that the relative role of small and entrepreneurial ﬁrms has in-
creased. Thus, we capture changes in industry structures by changes in the rel-
ative importance of small ﬁrms.
In equation (1) the parameter γ  is positive. Deviations of the actual industry
structure from the optimal industry structure negatively affect economic
growth, both when the industry structure consists of too few or too many small
ﬁrms. In either case there is a deviation from the optimal industry structure and
number of small ﬁrms. Taking the ﬁrst difference of equation (1) we obtain




In case both SFPcp–1 and SFPcp–2 are above the optimal small-ﬁrm share, the ex-
pression between brackets reduces to ∆ SFPcp–1. Indeed, in case the small-ﬁrm
share is too high, adding small ﬁrms to the industry structure reduces economic
growth. In case both SFPcp–1 and SFPcp–2 are below the optimal small-ﬁrm
share, the expression between brackets reduces to – ∆ SFPcp–1. An increase in
the small ﬁrm share when this presence is below optimal enhances economic
performance. Therefore, the sign of the parameter of ∆ SFPcp–1 reﬂects whether
the small ﬁrm presence is below or above the optimal levels for the countries
under consideration. In case the parameter is negative, the industry structure
consists of too many small ﬁrms. In case the parameter is positive, the reverse
holds and the industry structure consists of too few small ﬁrms.
We will denote the parameter of ∆ SFPcp–1 as κ . Note that this is not the same
parameter as γ , since the sign of κ  is dependent on whether the actual small-
ﬁrm share is above or below the optimal one. So, κ  can be both positive and
negative whereas γ  is necessarily positive.
We make some further assumptions to transform equation (2) into an equation
that can be estimated using the data at hand. First, we approximate ∆ SFPcp–1 by
∆ SF cp–1 – ∆ LF cp–1, the difference between the growth of small ﬁrms and large
ﬁrms in terms of value-of-shipments. Second, we assume that ∆ GNP*
cp is idio-
syncratic with respect to time and country. Therefore country dummies and time
dummies (the last to correct for European wide business cycle effects) are in-
cluded. Thus, ∆∆ GNP*
cp is approximated by time dummies only because the
country dummies drop out when taking ﬁrst differences. Third, we add an error
term ecp. Summarizing we haveD. B. AUDRETSCH, M. A. CARREE, A. J. VAN STEL AND A. R. THURIK
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∆ GNPcp = ∆ GNP cp–1 + β pDp + κ (∆ SFcp–1 – ∆ LFcp–1) + ecp (3)
where Dp denote dummy variables for periods p = 1,..., P. Factors speciﬁc to
each time period are reﬂected by β p. A high value of this parameter indicates
an unexplained increase in the extent of economic growth. In case of a low β p
the reverse holds. The contribution of the shift in the size class distribution of
ﬁrms to the percentage growth of GNP is represented by κ . The inﬂuence of this
shift on GNP growth is lagged. This implies that p = 1,..., P runs from 1990
through 1994 when applying equation (3) to our European data set.
To estimate equation (3), we use data provided by the European Observatory
(EIM/ENSR 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997). The European Observatory
provides data on the annual percentage growth of real gross value added of the
(non-primary) private sector, the annual percentage growth of value-of-ship-
ments of small- and medium-sized ﬁrms (with employment less than 250 em-
ployees), as well as the annual percentage growth of value-of-shipments of
large ﬁrms (with employment of at least 250 employees). These data are avail-
able for ﬁve years (1989 through 1993) for all ﬁfteen member countries of the
European Union (Europe-15), Iceland, Norway and Switzerland (including
Liechtenstein)8.
Hence, our European data set consists of a total of 90 (18 countries times ﬁve
years) observations. However, Germany had to be omitted for the entire period.
Germany’s then recent uniﬁcation led to speciﬁc economic perturbations that
render it inappropriate for inclusion in the estimation model. The remaining 85
observations are used for computing the regression coefﬁcients. The lowest val-
ues of ∆ SF cp – ∆ LF cp in the data set are –2.5%-point (Finland, 1993) and –1.8%-
point (Norway, 1989), while the highest values are 2.1%-point (Finland, 1989)
and 1.9%-point (United Kingdom, 1989). The mean value is –0.2%-point. The
period 1990–1994 is characterized by relatively vehement cyclical movements
with 1992 being a recession year and 1994 being a year with an exceptional
strong recovery.
In Table 1 the regression results for the period 1990–1994 are presented.
Equation (3) does not contain country dummies. The ‘mean’ country effect is
reﬂected by coefﬁcient α  while D1991 is left out of all computations to avoid full
multicollinearity9. The two dummy variables with a signiﬁcant contribution are
8. The European Observatory database is largely based on the Eurostat publication Enterprises in
Europe, which contains harmonised information for each of the countries listed above on the
number of enterprises, employment, turnover, value added and labour costs, by industry and size
class. For some countries, estimates have been made in case of incomplete data.
9. Instead of estimating coefﬁcients for all P time dummies as suggested by equation (3), we actu-
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D1993 and D1994. This reﬂects the strong economic recovery after the recession
of 1992. We present both results with all time dummies included and with the
two insigniﬁcant dummies excluded. In the ﬁrst part of Table 1 weighted least
squares results are presented, with total employment as the weighting variable.
In the second part of the table ordinary least squares results are presented.
In each of the cases we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient (at the 5% sig-
niﬁcance level) for κ . Its value ranges from 0.55 for the ﬁrst column of Table 1
to 0.92 for the last column10.
The empirical evidence suggests that the consequences for economic growth
of not shifting the industry structure away from large business towards smaller
ones are rather large. However, this result is qualiﬁed by the large standard de-
viation of the coefﬁcient for κ . Another important qualiﬁcation to these results
is that measurement of the variables includes a number of estimates. Follow-up
studies are required for corroboration of these results11. Still, the estimated κ  is
found to be signiﬁcantly positive in all computations. We conclude, based on
the empirical ﬁndings, that there is evidence that on average those countries
that have experienced a shift in their industry structures away from large ﬁrms
and towards small ﬁrms have also experienced greater economic growth, at
least for a sample of Western European countries over a recent time period.
Since our interpretation is that this shift is an indicator of the stage of the tran-
sition of the economy from a managed one to an entrepreneurial one, we con-
clude that European countries that progress on this transition track seem to
have been rewarded with additional growth12.
10. To control for possible country selection effects, we have run the regression 17 times independ-
ently, each time with one country excluded from the sample and with a model speciﬁcation with
only dummies for the years 1993 and 1994 in equation (3). The estimates of κ  range from 0.53
(t-value 1.71) to 0.68 (t-value 2.67) using weighted least squares and from 0.73 (t-value 1.63)
to 1.01 (t-value 2.43) using ordinary least squares.
11. Carree and Thurik (1998, 1999) provide complementary analyses showing the consequence of
lagging behind in this restructuring process in manufacturing. Using a sample of 14 manufac-
turing industries in 13 European countries and 13 manufacturing industries in 12 European
countries, respectively, they ﬁnd that, on average, the employment share of large ﬁrms in 1990
has had a negative effect on growth of output in the subsequent four-year period. 
12. It is conceivable that there is reversed causality, i.e. that the degree of industry restructuring is depend-
ent on the level of economic growth. To correct for business cycle effects, we estimate the following
equation: ∆ SFcp – ∆ LFcp = µ  + v∆ GNPcp + ε cp for the period 1989–1993. The estimated residuals of this
equation, ˆ ε cp, can be seen as the variable ∆ SFcp – ∆ LFcp, corrected for business cycle effects. Equation
(3) is now estimated for the period 1990–1994 (note that there is lag in (3)), with ∆ SFcp – ∆ LFcp re-
placed by ˆ ε cp. The estimate of v is 0.00 (t-value 0.01) using WLS and –0.04 (t-value –1.43) using OLS.
As a consequence, the estimated value of κ  in equation (3) is the same as in Table 1 using WLS and is
0.62 (t-value 1.45) using OLS (only dummies for 1993 and 1994). After correcting for reversed cau-
sality, the estimate of κ  equals 0.6 in all four versions of Table 1. We conclude that omission of the
option of reversed causality hardly inﬂuences the size and sign of the effects as represented in Table 1.D. B. AUDRETSCH, M. A. CARREE, A. J. VAN STEL AND A. R. THURIK
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One has to be careful interpreting the estimation results for different coun-
tries. The estimated positive value of κ  must be viewed as an average value of
the (unobserved) κ c’s of the different countries. So, the positive value found for
κ  does not mean that in all countries in the sample an increase in small-ﬁrm
presence is rewarded with additional growth. There may be countries in the sam-
ple where small-ﬁrm presence is indeed above the optimal level and conse-
quently, a further increase in the number of small ﬁrms leads to a growth penalty
instead of a growth reward. The estimation results do indicate, however, that for
the majority of countries in the sample, the number of small ﬁrms was too low
in the period under consideration. In translating the positive value of κ  in terms
of implications for different countries, policy makers should compare small-
ﬁrm presence in their own country with that in surrounding countries. If SFP is
relatively low, small-ﬁrm presence may be expected to be below optimum, given
the positive value of κ . On the other hand, if SFP is relatively high, small-ﬁrm
presence might exceed optimum, despite the estimated κ  being positive.
Table 1
Regression Results for Equation (3): Relating Growth to Structure1, 2 









































R2 0.441 0.422 0.318 0.317
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.401 0.275 0.291
DW 2.05 2.04 1.72 1.72
N 8 58 58 58 5
Notes: 1 Regression for 17 European countries over the period 1990–1994. 2 DW is the Durbin-
Watson statistic. T-values between parentheses. 3 Weighting variable for WLS is total em-
ploymentIMPEDED INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING
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The regression results are illustrated using Figure 1. We have grouped the
growth-acceleration observations, ∆∆ GNP = ∆ GNP cp – ∆ GNP cp–1, on the basis
of the degree to which the value-of-shipments shifted from large to small ﬁrms.
That is, the ∆∆ GNP observations have been sorted in order of the values of the
(lagged) structural change variable, ∆ SF – ∆ LF. Both variables have been com-
puted in deviation of the mean per year in order to correct for speciﬁc year ef-
fects. The 85 sorted observations have been divided into ﬁve groups of 17 ob-
servations. The averages of both ∆ SF – ∆ LF and ∆∆ GNP are displayed in
Figure 1. We see that, on average, a larger shift toward smallness is associated
with a higher growth acceleration.
Figure 1
Growth Accelerations and the Relative Shift Toward Small Firms1 
Notes: 1 Averages of ﬁve groups of growth acceleration values (∆∆ GNP), ordered on the basis of the de-
gree of change toward small ﬁrms (∆ SF – ∆ LF), both in deviation of yearly country-averages.
Both axes are scaled in percentage points.
V . CONCLUSIONS
An extensive literature has linked the structure of industries to performance.
However, little is known about the consequences of deviating from the optimal
industry structure. The evidence provided in this paper suggests that, in fact,
there is a cost of not adjusting industry structure towards the optimal. This cost
is measured in terms of forgone economic growth.D. B. AUDRETSCH, M. A. CARREE, A. J. VAN STEL AND A. R. THURIK
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Most developed countries have experienced a shift towards a more decen-
tralized industry structure in the last several decades. The magnitude of this
shift and speed of adjustment varies considerably across countries. The evi-
dence suggests that those countries that have shifted industry structure towards
decentralization in a more rapid fashion have been rewarded by higher growth
rates13.
Our analysis is based upon whether excess growth of small ﬁrms over their
larger counterparts has led to additional macro-economic growth for member
countries of the European Union in the early 1990s. The results of this investi-
gation are meant to supplement the intuition of many policymakers that the
changes in industrial structure have had some real effects on economic per-
formance.
European public policy has been preoccupied with generating economic
growth and reducing unemployment. The resulting policy debate has typically
focused on macroeconomic policies and instruments. The results of this paper
suggest that an additional set of instruments may also be valuable in generating
growth – policies focusing on allowing the industry structure to adjust. As the
evidence shows, just as countries reluctant to shift their industry structures will
be penalized by lower growth rates, those nations able to harness the forces of
technology and globalization by transforming their industry structures are re-
warded by growth dividends.
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SUMMARY
This paper documents that a process of industrial restructuring has been transforming the developed
economies, where large corporations are accounting for less economic activity and small ﬁrms are
accounting for a greater share of economic activity. Not all countries, however, are experiencing the
same shift in their industrial structures. Little is known about the cost of resisting this restructuring
process. The goal of this paper is to identify whether there is a cost, measured in terms of forgone
growth, of an impeded restructuring process. The cost is measured by linking growth rates of Euro-
pean countries to deviations from the ‘optimal’ industrial structure. The empirical evidence suggests
that countries impeding the restructuring process pay a penalty in terms of forgone growth.IMPEDED INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die vorliegende Studie zeigt, daß der Prozeß industrieller Umstrukturierung diejenigen unter den
entwickelten Volkswirtschaften verändert hat, in denen wirtschaftliche Aktivitäten weniger von gro-
ßen als von kleinen Unternehmen ausgehen. Nicht alle Länder erleben jedoch identische Umgestal-
tungen ihrer Industriestrukturen. Über die Kosten des Widerstands gegen Umstrukturierungsprozesse
ist bislang wenig bekannt. Die vorliegende Studie zielt deshalb darauf ab, diese Kosten zu identiﬁ-
zieren und in ihrer Höhe abzuschätzen. Die Kosten werden empirisch als ‘Verlust an Wachstum’ ge-
messen, indem die Wachstumsraten europäischer Länder auf die Abweichungen von einer ‘optima-
len’ Industriestruktur bezogen werden. Die empirischen Ergebnisse implizieren, daß Länder, die
Umstrukturierungsprozesse behindern, einen Preis in der Form eingebüßten Wachstums bezahlen.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article montre que le processus de restructuration industrielle a transformé les pays développés
où les grandes entreprises ont une moindre part à l’activité économique, tandis que les PME en cou-
vrent une plus grande partie. Cependant, cette restructuration industrielle n’est pas la même dans
tous les pays. Les coûts encourus par les pays s’opposant à cette transformation sont à peine connus.
Le but de cet article est donc d’identiﬁer les coûts d’un processus de restructuration entravé et d’en
estimer le montant. Ces coûts sont mesurés en termes de ‘croissance manquée’, en liant les taux de
croissance de pays européens aux déviations d’une structure industrielle jugée ‘optimale’. Les résul-
tats empiriques suggèrent que les pays qui entravent le processus de restructuration en payent le prix
sous forme de croissance manquée.D. B. AUDRETSCH, M. A. CARREE, A. J. VAN STEL AND A. R. THURIK
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